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Cost Containment and the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act
David Orentlicher

*

The legislation “puts into place virtually every cost-control
reform proposed by physicians, economists, and health policy
experts.”
- Peter Orszag and Ezekiel Emanuel1
"The job of figuring how to cover uninsured people used up all
the political oxygen that was available. They didn't have the
energy for costs."
- Alan Sager2
For decades, the U.S. health care system has grappled with two
key problems — inadequate access to coverage and increasingly unaffordable health care costs. Paradoxically, the U.S. spends far more of
its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care than do other economically-advanced democracies, yet provides health care insurance
to fewer of its citizens.3
During the debate that led to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, public officials recognized the need
to address the problems of both access and cost, but in the end, the
Act does far more about increasing access than it does about cutting
*
Samuel R. Rosen Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Hall Center for Law and
Health, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis; MD, Harvard Medical School; JD,
Harvard Law School. The author wrote this paper while serving as a visiting professor of law at
University of Iowa College of Law.
1
Peter R. Orszag & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Health Care Reform and Cost Control, 363 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 601, 603 (2010).
2
John Dorschner, Cost Issues Remain Despite Healthcare Reforms, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 31, 2010 (quoting Alan Sager).
3
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH PER CAPITA, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecdilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/total-expenditure-on-health-per-capita_20758480-table2 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011).
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costs. And this result is not surprising. As a matter of politics, it is
much easier to sell the public on more benefits than greater sacrifice,
so cost control was largely left to another day. To be sure, taking a
wider-coverage-first, cost-containment-second approach is not unique
to the Affordable Care Act. Health care reforms typically expand
access initially and envision cost containment as the next step. That
4
was the approach of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965; it also was the
strategy for Massachusetts when it passed its health care reform in
5
2006. Still, we are left with the question of whether future Congresses will implement the measures necessary to tame health care
cost inflation or whether uncontrolled costs will cause the Affordable
Care Act to unravel.
I. THE COST PROBLEM
For many years, the United States has spent more than other
countries on health care, and the gap is only widening. In 2008, for
example, the U.S. spent more than $7,500 per capita on health care,
which was more than double what Germany spent and nearly three
6
times what New Zealand spent. To some extent, it makes sense for
the U.S. to spend more on health care — as a country’s wealth increases, so does its ability to fund services like health care that can prolong
life and improve health. But even as a percentage of GDP, the U.S.
spends far more than other countries on health care. In 2008, for example, Germany spent at 66 percent of the U.S. level, and New Zealand spent at 61 percent of the U.S. level.7
It is not only the case that the U.S. spends much more than anyone else; there also is the problem that the U.S. realizes a smaller return on its health care dollar. In one study, researchers compared the
actual improvement in health in different countries with the potential
improvement that could have been achieved with the dollars that the
countries spent.8 By that measure, the U.S. health care system was
less efficient than the systems in Western European countries like the
UK, Spain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy; Northern European
countries like Denmark, Norway and Sweden; Far Eastern countries
4
David Blumenthal & James Morone, The Lessons of Success—Revisiting the Medicare
Story, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2384, 2384, 2388 (2008).
5
Jon Kingsdale, Implementing Health Care Reform in Massachusetts: Strategic Lessons
Learned, 28 HEALTH AFF. w588, w588, w589 (2009).
6
OECDILIBRARY, supra note 3, at 1.
7
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ON HEALTH, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
social-issues-migration-health/total-expenditure-on-health_20758480-table1 (last updated Mar.
11, 2011).
8
David B. Evans et al., Comparative Efficiency of National Health Systems: Cross National Econometric Analysis, 323 BMJ 307 (2001).
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like Japan, China and Australia; and Western Hemisphere countries
9
like Canada, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela.
The inefficiency of the health care system is reflected in key statistics on the quality of health. Thus, life expectancy in the U.S. trails
that of Japan, Switzerland, Canada, France, Italy, Spain, Israel, Germany, Greece and the U.K., while the infant mortality rate is higher in
the U.S.10
To some extent, U.S. citizens benefit from the higher levels of
spending. For example, survival rates for patients with breast or colon
cancer tend to be higher in the U.S.11 However, in many other ways,
the greater spending does not translate into better health. People
with asthma or diabetes are much more likely to need treatment in a
hospital at some point during the year in the U.S. than in other countries. Americans are more than six times as likely as Canadians to be
hospitalized for asthma and more than five times as likely as Italians
12
to be hospitalized for diabetes.
One might suppose that the U.S. gets less bang for its health care
buck because Americans are not as healthy as citizens of other countries. That does not seem to be the explanation either. Americans are
more obese than others, often much more so,13 but they also are less
14
likely to smoke tobacco or consume alcohol. Americans also are
younger,15 which should mean lower health care costs. According to
one study, Americans are overall less healthy than in other economically-advanced countries, but the additional cost from the greater

9

Id. at 309 fig.1.
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, TOTAL POPULATION, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/life-expectancy-at-birth-total-population_20758
480-table8 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011); INFANT MORTALITY, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.
oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/infant-mortality_20758480-table9 (last updated
Mar. 11, 2011).
11 Disparities in Health Expenditure Across OECD Countries: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aging, 111th Cong., 5 chts.4 & 5 (2009) (statement of Mark Pearson, Head, Health
Division, OECD), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf.
12 Id. at 5 chts.6 & 7.
13 OVERWEIGHT OR OBESE FEMALES, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.
org/social-issues-migration-health/overweight-or-obese-females_20758480-table15 (last updated
June 8, 2010); OVERWEIGHT OR OBESE MALES, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/
social-issues-migration-health/overweight-or-obese-males_20758480-table16 (last updated June
8, 2010).
14 TOBACCO CONSUMPTION, OECDILIBRARY, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issuesmigration-health/tobacco-consumption_20758480-table14 (last updated Mar. 11, 2011).
15 Median Age, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2177.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2011).
10
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“disease burden” amounted to only $25 billion out of nearly $2 trillion
16
in health care spending.
If the high U.S. health care costs cannot be explained by a less
healthy population or greater health benefits from health care spending, why does the U.S. spend more than other countries? Costs are
higher in the U.S. in large part because prices for health care services
are higher.17 Coronary artery bypass surgery and hip replacements,
for example, are twice as expensive in the U.S. as in Canada.18 Simi19
larly, physicians are more highly compensated in the U.S. While the
reasons for the higher costs are not entirely clear, experts cite the
weaker bargaining power of purchasers of health care services in the
U.S. and the greater bargaining power of sellers of services. On the
purchasing side, governments in other countries typically negotiate
standard fee schedules that apply across the board; private insurers in
the U.S. have less leverage than governments in their dealings with
doctors, hospitals and pharmaceutical companies.20 On the selling
side, mergers and other consolidations of services have enabled hos21
pitals to implement higher charges. Physician fees may be driven
higher in part by the high cost of medical education in the U.S.; doctors in other countries graduate with substantially less educational
22
debt.
It also appears that U.S. health care costs are high because of
high numbers of surgical procedures, particularly coronary artery bypass surgeries and other cardiovascular procedures.23 Americans also
are more than twice as likely as citizens of other economicallyadvanced countries to have an MRI or CT scan.24

16 CARLOS ANGRISANO ET AL., ACCOUNTING FOR THE COST OF HEALTH CARE IN THE
UNITED STATES 9-11 (Jan. 2007), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/reports/pdfs/healthcare/MGI_
US_HC_fullreport.pdf. U.S. health care spending reached $2.5 trillion in 2009. National Health
Expenditures 2009 Highlights, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, https://www.
cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
17 Gerard Anderson et al., It’s The Prices, Stupid: Why The United States Is So Different
From Other Countries, 22 HEALTH AFF. 89, 98 (2003).
18 CHRIS L. PETERSON & RACHEL BURTON, U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING:
COMPARISON
WITH
OTHER
OECD
COUNTRIES
22
(Sept.
17,
2007),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1316&context=key_workplace.
Price differentials are even greater for countries like India and Thailand, spurring the growth of
“medical tourism.” I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the
Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1471-73 (2010).
19 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 17-19.
20 Anderson et al., supra note 17, at 102.
21 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 42.
22 Id. at 59.
23 Id. at 3 fig.9; Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum, THE NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at
36.
24 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 12, 15 figs.12 & 13.

2010]

Case Containment and the PPACA

71

There are important structural features of the U.S. health care
system that foster the high prices and high volumes that characterize
American health care. For example, because health care insurance
covers most of the costs for most Americans, patients become insensitive to the fees they are charged. When patients pay a co-payment of
$25, they will desire treatment as long as the value of the treatment to
the patient is more than $25. Thus, if a treatment provides a value of
$50, the patient will want it. But a treatment with a value of $50 may
have a total cost of $150 (with the insurer picking up the other $125 of
the cost) and therefore really is not worth providing. In short, from
the perspective of overall social benefits and costs, patients demand
25
too much health care.
Just as patients have too great an incentive to seek care, physicians and hospitals have too great an incentive to offer care. Under
the predominant “fee-for-service” method of reimbursement, providers of health care are paid more for doing more.26 Whether needed or
not, a surgical procedure pays very well, and there is good reason to
think that financial incentives in the U.S. lead physicians to perform
many unnecessary operations. As indicated above, U.S. physicians
perform surgeries at much higher rates than their counterparts in other countries. In addition, when researchers compare the practices of
U.S. physicians in high-procedure communities with the practices of
U.S. physicians in low-procedure communities, they find that procedure rates are similar when there is strong evidence demonstrating the
value of the care. However, when the benefit of the care is less clear,
it is much more likely to be performed in the high-procedure communities.27 In other words, it appears that the difference between
high- and low-procedure communities is not that too few procedures
are performed in the low-procedure communities but that too many
procedures are performed in the high-procedure communities. And
the financial rewards from performing extra procedures likely play a
major role in the decisions of physicians and hospitals to provide

25 Of course, the incentive effects of insurance do not distinguish the U.S. health care
system from systems in other countries. There too, insurance encourages patients to demand
too much health care. However, other countries employ strategies that counteract the incentive
effects of insurance. For example, as mentioned above, governments and insurers in other countries negotiate less generous fee schedules for reimbursement of physicians and hospitals.
26 David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 158 (1996).
27 Elliott S. Fisher et al., Health Care 2009: Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs —
Lessons from Regional Variation, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 849, 850-51 (2009).
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them. Indeed, when physicians are paid a salary, they are less likely
28
to order lab tests, request radiologic scans or perform surgeries.
The problem is exacerbated because physicians and hospitals often find that they lose money when they provide higher-quality, lower-cost care. Preventing the need for hospitalization pays much less
than does treating a patient in the hospital. Mt. Sinai Hospital in New
York learned that lesson after opening clinics for patients with diabetes. Patients treated at the clinics lowered their weight and reduced their blood sugar levels. While the clinics were successful in
terms of improving patient health, they operated with substantial fiscal deficits and ultimately were closed.29
Other commonly-given explanations for the high costs of care in
the U.S. are not supported by the data. For example, the legal costs
from medical malpractice are less than one percent of total health
care costs, and defensive medicine also represents a very small part of
the health care budget.30
II. WILL THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT SOLVE THE HEALTH CARE
COST PROBLEM?
While the Affordable Care Act includes many different provisions to contain costs, there is a serious question whether those provisions really address the cost problem. For the most part, the Act does
not take on the major drivers of higher costs, other than to some extent through demonstration projects.
Before looking at the cost-containing provisions of the Affordable Care Act, it is worth considering the kinds of reforms that would
be effective at controlling health care spending. Then we can see
whether the Act includes potentially effective reforms.
How might the U.S. respond to the factors that drive health care
costs higher? As discussed in the previous section, key factors include
the existence of health care insurance (which makes patients too insensitive to the costs of their care), fee-for-service reimbursement
(which makes physicians and other providers of health care too insensitive to the necessity of care), and the relatively weak bargaining
power of insurance companies (which keeps health care prices too
high). Patients are too willing to seek more care, physicians and hos28 David Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives, 322 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1059, 1060-62 (1990).
29 Ian Urbina, In the Treatment of Diabetes, Success Often Does Not Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 2006, at A1.
30 PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 41-42; see also Gerard F. Anderson et al.,
Health Spending in the United States and the Rest of the Industrialized World, 24 HEALTH AFF.
903, 909-11 (2005).
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pitals are too willing to provide more care, and prices are too high for
the care that is provided.
A. Changing the Incentives for Patients
A number of commentators believe that health care cost inflation
can be tamed by giving patients more “skin in the game.”31 If patients
were to pay a higher percentage of the costs of care at the time they
decide whether to seek care, they will be less likely to demand too
much care. Thus, for example, many employers have adopted health
32
savings accounts that include high deductibles; most employers also
have raised patient co-payments or co-insurance percentages.33 Proponents of patient incentives are correct that raising deductibles, copayments, or co-insurance responsibilities will reduce the demand for
health care.
However, the potential effectiveness of these incentives is limited. First, the idea behind patient incentives is to discourage the
likelihood that patients will seek unnecessary care. Instead of going
to the doctor when sick with the common cold, for example, patients
will more appropriately nurse themselves at home. But when patients
reduce their demand for care on account of higher deductibles and
other fees, they often reduce their demand across the board, for both
necessary and unnecessary care.34 The individual with abdominal pain
may hesitate to see a doctor, turning an uncomplicated appendicitis
into a ruptured appendix that requires a longer hospitalization and
35
post-operative recovery. Second, patient deductibles, co-payments
and co-insurance would have to be higher than what would be acceptable to people to make them truly effective. Consider, for example,
the patient faced with coronary artery bypass surgery and a choice
between a total cost at one hospital of $40,000 and a total cost at
another hospital of $50,000. With either hospital, a deductible of even
$2,500 would be eaten up, so the existence of a high deductible would
not drive the patient to the cheaper hospital. Having a 10 or 20 per31

MARK HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW
991-93 (7th ed. 2007).
32 A deductible refers to the amount of health care costs for which the insured individual is
responsible before insurance kicks in. Deductibles in health savings accounts run from $1,000 to
$2,500.
33 Co-payments and co-insurance refer to the patient’s share of health care costs once
insurance does kick in. For example, a patient may pay a $25 co-payment toward the cost of a
visit to a physician and pay 10 percent of the costs of hospital care as co-insurance.
34 Melinda B. Buntin et al., Consumer Directed Health Care: Early Evidence About Effects
On Cost And Quality, 24 HEALTH AFF. w516, w523-25 (2006).
35 Paula Braveman et al., Insurance-Related Differences in the Risk of Ruptured Appendix,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 444, 446-48 (1994).
AND ETHICS
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cent co-insurance rate might make a difference in the patient’s choice
of hospital, but health care policies typically blunt the impact of coinsurance by capping a person’s annual out-of-pocket costs. If a plan
had a 10 percent co-insurance rate and an annual out-of-pocket cap of
$2,400 (the cap that I have under my individual health care insurance
policy at Indiana University), then participants would lose their incentive to consider costs once a procedure’s costs exceeded $24,000.
Raising the out-of-pocket cap would encourage greater cost sensitivity, but it also would undermine the very purpose of health care insurance — the protection of individuals from unaffordable health care
costs.
Another approach to changing patient incentives is included in
Section 9001 of the Affordable Care Act, which imposes a so-called
“Cadillac” tax. Starting in 2018, there will be a 40 percent tax on
high-cost health care plans to the extent that the cost of the coverage
exceeds a threshold amount. The threshold starts at $10,200 for individuals and $27,500 for families (which is about double the current
36
average cost for health care coverage). The threshold amount is adjusted upward for health care cost inflation and to take into account
the higher costs of the purchaser’s risk pool.37 The tax is expected to
38
generate revenues of $32 billion in 2018 and 2019.
The Section 9001 tax is designed to counteract the tax code’s current incentive for employers to offer very expensive health care plans.
Because health care benefits are not taxed as income, employees can
use “pre-tax” dollars to purchase their health care insurance.39 For
people who pay 35 percent of their wages in payroll taxes and federal,
state and local income taxes, a dollar spent on health care coverage
costs them only 65 cents in foregone take-home pay.40

36 Richard S. Foster, Estimated Financial Effects of the “Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act,” as Amended, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 17 (Apr. 22, 2010),
https://www.cms.gov/ActuarialStudies/Downloads/PPACA_2010-04-22.pdf;
LAW,
EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,
968-70 (C.C.H. ed., 2010) (explaining ¶ 2205 Excise Tax on High Cost Employer-Sponsored
Health Coverage).
37 Foster, supra note 36, at 17 n.15; LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, supra note 36, at 969-71.
38 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE Table 2 (Mar. 20, 2010), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
113xx/doc11379/AmendReconProp.pdf.
39 While people often think that their employer is paying for their health care benefits, in
fact, the employer is simply taking part of the worker’s compensation and paying it in the form
of health care benefits instead of salary. David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance
and Universal Coverage: Four Things People Know that Aren't So, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. &
ETHICS 435, 437-38 (2009).
40 Jon Gabel et al., Taxing Cadillac Plans May Produce Chevy Results, 29 HEALTH AFF.
174, 174 (2010).
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The Section 9001 tax likely will have only a small impact on
health care costs. As critics of Cadillac taxes have observed, high-cost
health care plans do not have high costs because of overly generous
benefits. Rather, the high costs reflect the relatively poor health status of the workforce covered by the plan and the relatively high health
41
care costs of the local community.
While changing the incentives for patients does not seem very
promising, changing the incentives for physicians, hospitals and other
providers seems more promising.
B.

Changing the Incentives for Physicians and Hospitals

As discussed, fee-for-service reimbursement encourages physicians and hospitals to provide too much care, and society ends up with
unnecessarily high costs, as well as a lower quality of care. Accordingly, replacing fee-for-service reimbursement with salaries or capitation
42
fees for physicians and fixed budgets for hospitals would delink provider income from the volume of services provided. Indeed, by eliminating fee-for-service reimbursement, good preventive care would be
turned from a financial loser into a financial winner. If hospitals like
Mt. Sinai were operating under a fixed budget and they kept patients
with diabetes from needing expensive hospitalizations, the hospitals
might increase their profits rather than run deficits.
Health policy experts also have urged a linkage between reimbursement and quality of care. Instead of paying physicians and hospitals for the amount of care that they provide, insurers would pay for
health care services on the basis of the results that are achieved. And
quality-based, “pay for performance” incentives have become common in health care in the past decade.43
In principle, a shift in reward from quantity to quality of care
makes a good deal of sense and could do much to improve our health
care system. However, for many reasons, it is difficult to implement
quality-based reimbursement in practice: Patients may do well or
poorly because of the physician’s care or because of factors beyond
41 Id. at 179-80. Accordingly, as mentioned, the threshold amount for the tax is higher for
plans that insure groups with relatively poor health status or who receive care in communities
with higher health care costs. Critics of Cadillac taxes also have observed that reducing tax
subsidies for health care insurance may have a regressive effect (i.e., the higher taxes may
represent a higher percentage of income for lower-income persons). David U. Himmelstein &
Steffie Woolhandler, The Regressivity of Taxing Employer-Paid Health Insurance, 361 NEW ENG.
J. MED. e101 (2009), available at http://healthpolicyandreform.nejm.org/?p=1521.
42 With capitation, physicians are paid a fixed amount per patient per year to provide care
for their patients. Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 158-59.
43 REWARDING PROVIDER PERFORMANCE: ALIGNING INCENTIVES IN MEDICARE 22
(Institute of Medicine ed., 2007).
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the physician’s control, like the patient’s underlying health status, and
it is not always easy to determine which really mattered for a particular patient. For many kinds of care, it can take years to see results.
And for many kinds of care, we really do not know the optimal ap44
proach. While the jury is still out on pay for performance, a recent
study yielded disappointing results from this approach to compensa45
tion for physicians.
Besides changing the form of reimbursement, there is a second
important way to counteract existing incentives for physicians and
hospitals to provide too much care. Currently, the U.S. enjoys an abundance of hospital beds, surgical suites and MRI scanners. With the
high capacity, it is too easy for physicians to provide unnecessary hospitalizations, operations or MRI scans. Even if their financial motive
is diminished by salaried or capitated reimbursement, physicians still
may be driven by the inclination to intervene and try to do something
when a patient is sick. This behavior can be blunted by reducing
health care facility capacity. If hospital beds, surgical suites and MRI
facilities are closed, physicians will have to become more discriminating when they decide whether to recommend a diagnostic test or therapeutic procedure. And data demonstrate that physicians can do a
good job when faced with lowered capacity. In communities that have
closed hospitals, or in hospitals that have closed intensive care unit
(ICU) beds, physicians hospitalize fewer patients and provide less
intensive care for those who are hospitalized without compromising
the quality of patient care.46
C.

Increasing the Bargaining Power of Purchasers of Health Care

As discussed previously, a key factor in the high U.S. health care
costs lies in higher U.S. prices for health care. Accordingly, some experts support government-sponsored negotiation of standard fee
schedules that would apply to all physicians and hospitals. This would
increase the bargaining power on the purchasing side of health care,
and prices should be lower, as seen in other countries that have this
47
“all-payer” fee regulation.

44

Orentlicher, supra note 26, at 183-86.
Brian Serumaga et al., Effect of Pay for Performance on the Management and Outcomes
of Hypertension in the United Kingdom: Interrupted Time Series Study, 342 BRIT. MED. J. d108
(2011).
46 David Orentlicher, Rationing Health Care: It's a Matter of the Health Care System's
Structure, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 449, 450 (2010).
47 Jonathan Oberlander & Joseph White, Systemwide Cost Control — The Missing Link in
Health Care Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1131, 1132 (2009).
45
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While this approach would likely yield lower prices for health
care and it might reduce overall health care costs, it would not provide
a full solution to the cost problem. If fees are lowered, physicians
could compensate by trying to make up the difference with a higher
volume of services. Indeed, that is what has happened in Japan,
where patients are more likely to see doctors and receive MRI or CT
48
scans than in the U.S. Fees can be reduced in response to increases
in volume, but we would end up solving the cost problem without
solving the quality problem. Our problem of high costs and too many
unnecessary procedures would be converted into a problem of even
more unnecessary procedures.
In sum, cost containment will require meaningful structural
changes in our health care system — in the way we pay physicians and
hospitals (salary or capitation instead of fee-for-service), in the way
reimbursement levels are set (a single payment schedule for all insurers instead of multiple schedules for different insurers), and/or in the
extent to which we supply doctors with hospital beds, MRI scanners
and other health care facilities.
As we turn to the Affordable Care Act’s cost-controlling provisions, we will see that they generally do not entail the kinds of structural changes that will “bend the cost curve.” Indeed, according to
estimates, the effect on health care cost inflation will be minimal. Between 2015 and 2019, health care costs are expected to rise 6.7 percent
per year instead of the 6.8 percent projection made before the Act
was passed.49
III. COST CONTAINMENT PROVISIONS
IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
The Affordable Care Act seeks to lower costs through a few
strategies. For example, the Act includes cuts in Medicare reimbursement, adjustments in Medicare reimbursement based on quality
of care, and greater cost sharing for Medicare beneficiaries. However,
the Act calls for the kinds of major structural reforms that could have
a substantial impact only through demonstration projects.
A. Cuts in Medicare and Medicaid Reimbursement
Under Section 3401 of the Affordable Care Act, hospitals, nursing homes and other health care facilities will receive fewer dollars
over the next ten years in Medicare payments. On an annual basis,
48

PETERSON & BURTON, supra note 18, at 12.
Andrea M. Sisko et al., National Health Spending Projections: The Estimated Impact of
Reform through 2019, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1, 4 (2010).
49
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Medicare increases its reimbursement rates for health care facilities to
reflect increases in the operating costs of the facilities. The Affordable Care Act maintains the annual reimbursement rate increases, but
provides for smaller increases by changing the formula for calculating
the rate increases. Through these reductions in the annual rate adjustment, health care spending should decline by $205 billion between
50
2010 and 2019.
Under Section 3201 of the Affordable Care Act, $145 billion in
51
savings are projected from the Medicare Advantage program. Medicare Advantage is an option for Medicare recipients to enroll in a private health care plan rather than choosing traditional, fee-for-service
coverage (Part C of Medicare). While the idea was to provide a
more-efficient, lower-cost Medicare option, Medicare Advantage
plans have turned out to be more expensive, with average premiums
higher than the cost per beneficiary of traditional Medicare.52 The
higher costs have reflected more generous benefits, lower cost-sharing
for Medicare beneficiaries and higher administrative costs.53 Under
the Affordable Care Act, Medicare will reduce payments to Medicare
Advantage plans.
Another $64 billion in savings are expected from a reduction in
disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments under the Medicare
and Medicaid programs.54 DSH payments are made to hospitals that
treat a disproportionate share of low-income patients. Originally,
Medicare DSH was introduced to compensate hospitals for the higher
costs of treating low-income patients. When the cost differential between low-income and higher-income patients narrowed, the DSH
payments were justified as a way to maintain access to care for lowincome patients — without the payments, hospitals in low-income

50 Foster, supra note 36, at page 3 of Table 3. The Congressional Budget Office also has
calculated estimates for the fiscal impact of PPACA, and there are differences between the two
sets of estimates. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 38, at 2. Part of the differences
reflects the fact that the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services estimates look at the impact
on total expenditures on health care in the United States, while the Budget Office estimates look
at the impact on the federal budget. Id.
51 Foster, supra note 36, at 8, page 2 of Table 3.
52 MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
MEDICARE PAYMENT POLICY 257-59 (Mar. 2009), http://medpac.gov/documents/Mar09_
EntireReport.pdf.
53 Id. at 259-60. Thus, rather than covering the expenses for the more generous benefits
and lower cost-sharing through greater efficiencies, the Medicare Advantage plans have covered
the expenses by shifting them to taxpayers and Medicare beneficiaries in traditional Medicare.
Id. at 252.
54 Foster, supra note 36, at 8, 12, page 2 of Table 3, page 2 of Table 4 (describing $50 billion in cuts in Medicare DSH payments, and $14 billion in cuts in Medicaid DSH payments from
Sections 3133 and 2551 of PPACA).
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55
areas might not be able to afford to stay open. Medicaid DSH was
created for hospitals with high numbers of uninsured patients to help
56
them cover the costs of care for the uninsured. With the expansion
of Medicaid eligibility and the subsidies for low-income individuals to
purchase health care insurance under the Affordable Care Act, the
disproportionate share hospitals will see significant growth in revenues. Hence, their need for subsidies will diminish.
The reductions in Medicare reimbursement, Medicare Advantage payments and DSH payments are important, but they are not
designed to address the real drivers of health care costs in the U.S.
They do not constitute the kinds of needed structural changes that
were discussed in the preceding section of this article (i.e., elimination
of fee-for-service reimbursement, adoption of a single payment schedule for all insurers, or a reduction in the number of hospital beds,
MRI scanners and other health care facilities).57

B.

Greater Cost-Sharing for Medicare Beneficiaries

In addition to saving money by reducing payments to hospitals
and insurers, the Affordable Care Act will save money — but only for
the government — by increasing the cost-sharing obligations of Medicare beneficiaries. Under Section 3402 of the Affordable Care Act,
premiums for Part B of Medicare will rise for higher-income beneficiaries. Part B covers physician fees, laboratory fees and other outpatient services, and most Medicare beneficiaries pay 25 percent of the
Part B premium, with the federal government picking up the other 75
percent. Currently, higher-income beneficiaries pay between 35 and
80 percent of the Part B premium, and the income thresholds at which
58
the higher premiums kick in are adjusted each year for inflation.
The Affordable Care Act freezes the income thresholds at 2010 levels
for ten years before resuming the annual adjustments.59 Thus, the Act
will make more Medicare beneficiaries subject to the higher pre60
miums. This provision will save an estimated $8 billion. However,
these are savings for the Medicare program but not for the overall

55 Linda E. Fishman & James D. Bentley, The Evolution of Support for Safety-Net Hospitals, 16(4) Health Affairs 30, 34-35 (1997).
56 Id. at 36.
57 We could see a reduction in health care facilities if lower reimbursement rates force
some facilities to close down.
58 LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT, supra note 36, ¶ 1380, at 592.
59 Id. at 593.
60 Foster, supra note 36, at page 4 of Table 3.
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health care budget. Medicare will spend $8 billion less, but Medicare
beneficiaries will pay $8 billion more for their health care.
C.

Reimbursement Based on Quality of Care

Reimbursement based on quality of care rather than quantity of
care has the potential for saving costs by reducing the amount of unnecessary — or unnecessarily expensive — care provided to patients.
Accordingly, Section 6301 of the Affordable Care Act establishes the
“Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute.”61 The Institute is
designed to promote comparative-effectiveness research (CER), research that evaluates and compares the benefits and risks of two or
more medical treatments or services.62 Thus, for example, CER might
demonstrate that for many patients with back pain, spinal surgery
provides no benefit compared to physical therapy. The Institute will
set priorities for funding CER studies, and it will analyze data from
CER studies and report to the public on the significance of the study
results.63 While the Institute may not recommend coverage changes
based on its analyses,64 Medicare and Medicaid may take the analyses
65
into account in determining coverage policies.
Because of concerns that the Institute could use its authority to
ration care, the Institute is prohibited from employing a dollars-perquality-adjusted-life-year (QALY) threshold, and the Medicare and
Medicaid programs are prohibited from using such a measure as a
threshold for coverage.66 This prohibition is designed to prevent the
Institute from assuming a role in the U.S. like that of the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in the UK. NICE
evaluates drugs and other treatments to determine their costeffectiveness, and the British National Health Service will not cover
treatments if their cost per QALY is too high.67 Thus, for example,
treatments are generally covered if they cost no more than £20,000
61 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6301, 124
Stat. 119, 727-46 [hereinafter PPACA] (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.A
(West 2010)).
62 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(a)(2)(A) (2010).
63 § 1320e(d)(1).
64 § 1320e(d)(8)(A)(iv).
65 § 1320e-1.
66 § 1320e-1(e). A quality-adjusted-life-year is a measure that takes into account how
much a medical treatment extends life and how much it improves quality of life. A treatment
that provides an additional year of perfect health provides one QALY. If the treatment costs
$10,000, it costs $10,000 per QALY. If another treatment prevents a 50 percent decline in health
for five years, it provides 2.5 QALYs. If the treatment costs $40,000 for the five years, it costs
$16,000 per QALY. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 491, 495 (1995).
67 Robert Steinbrook, Saying No Isn't NICE, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1977, 1977-79 (2008).
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per QALY, and they are rarely covered if they cost more than £30,000
68
per QALY. The unpopularity of cost-effectiveness thresholds like
that employed by NICE is illustrated not only by the Affordable Care
Act’s prohibition on their use but also by the decision in the UK in
October 2010 to strip NICE of its power to deny coverage of treat69
ments based on QALY thresholds.
The Affordable Care Act includes a number of provisions in the
Medicare program to link reimbursement to quality of care:
1. Medicare will make incentive payments to hospitals that meet
specified performance standards. The performance standards
could be created for any number of illnesses, but they must at
least be developed for the treatment of heart attacks, heart failure and pneumonia, the prevention of complications from surgery, and the prevention of infections transmitted during hospital
care or the provision of other health care services.70
2. Medicare will adjust payments to physicians based on the quality and cost of care that they provide to their patients.71
3. Medicare will expand its reports to physicians that indicate how
their use of resources in patient care compares to use by other
physicians.72 This will help physicians recognize when they are
providing unnecessarily high or dangerously low levels of care.
4. Medicare will reduce its payments to hospitals that have high
numbers of patients who become sicker because of their hospital
care.73 Many patients become infected or suffer other harms to
their health from preventable causes during their hospital stays.
The reductions in payment should spur hospitals to implement
better precautions to protect patient welfare.
5. Medicare also will reduce its payments to hospitals that have
excessive numbers of patients readmitted to the hospital after
discharge.74 This provision reflects the fact that readmission to
the hospital shortly after a hospitalization often occurs because
of inadequate care during the hospitalization.
68 At an exchange rate of 1.625 dollars to a pound, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2011, at C4,
£20,000 converts to $32,500 and £30,000 converts to nearly $49,000.
69 Sarah Boseley, NICE to Lose Powers to Decide on New Drugs, THE GUARDIAN (Oct.
29, 2010), www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/29/nice-to-lose-new-drug-power.
70 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001, 124 Stat. 119, 353-63, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I).
71 Id. § 3007, 124 Stat. 119, 373-76, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w—4(p).
72 Id. § 3003, 124 Stat. 119, 366-68, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w—4(n).
73 Id. § 3008, 124 Stat. 119, 376-78, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(p).
74 Id. § 3025, 124 Stat. 119, 408-13, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(q).
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Tying reimbursement to quality of care should blunt the incentives for physicians and hospitals to provide unnecessary care. How75
ever, as discussed above, it is difficult to develop quality-based reimbursement policies that are effective, and the track record for qualitybased incentives has been disappointing.
D. Structural Changes
Several provisions in the Affordable Care Act have the potential
for making the kinds of structural changes needed to make a real difference in health care cost inflation.
Section 3403 of the Act charges an “Independent Medicare Advisory Board” with developing proposals to keep Medicare spending
within statutory targets, and the Board’s proposals will automatically
take effect unless Congress adopts substitute provisions.76 The Board
may propose changes in reimbursement for physicians and hospitals,
but its proposals may not ration health care, raise costs to Medicare
beneficiaries, restrict benefits or modify Medicare eligibility criteria.77
The Board also will provide Congress with recommendations for
78
slowing the growth of health care spending in the private sector. The
Board’s authority commences in 2015, with estimated savings of $24
billion by 2019.79
The Advisory Board may achieve substantial savings in the longer term, particularly through its authorities to propose changes in
reimbursement under Medicare and to recommend ways to slow the
growth of health care spending in the private sector. However, the
Board’s design and mandate suggest potential concerns. Will the
Board focus on short-term fixes to keep Medicare spending within the
annual statutory targets rather than long-term changes that really can
“bend the cost curve?” Will Congress bypass the Board process and
authorize increases in funding through independent legislation? Are
the limitations on the kinds of proposals that the Board can develop
too restrictive? Since cuts in physician reimbursement may become a
key cost-cutting tool for the Board,80 will the Board’s policies reduce
patient access to physicians, as physicians opt for the higher payments
of private-insurance plans?

75

See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
See Timothy Jost, The Independent Payment Advisory Board, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED.
103, 103-04 (2010).
77 Id. at 104; 42 U.S.C. 1395kkk(c)(2)(A)(ii).
78 42 U.S.C. § 1395kkk(o)(1).
79 Foster, supra note 36, at page 4 of Table 3.
80 Jost, supra note 76, at 104.
76
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The Affordable Care Act also includes funding for demonstration projects to test out a number of promising structural reforms in
health care delivery.
1. Medicaid and Medicare will test “bundled payments” to cover
the cost of a patient’s care during a hospitalization and for the
month following discharge.81 This approach seeks to reduce
health care costs by giving physicians and hospitals incentives to
provide more cost-effective care rather than simply more care.
Because the government will pay a fixed amount to cover all of
the patient’s care during the hospitalization and post-discharge
care, hospitals and doctors will lose money if they order unnecessary tests or provide unnecessary treatments. Moreover, they
will lose money if they deliver inadequate care, and as a result,
the patient needs to be re-hospitalized shortly after discharge.
I call this approach “capitation lite” because it draws on the economizing incentives of capitation payments, but it does so only
for individual episodes of hospital care. Doctors and hospitals
still can make money by hospitalizing patients who really do not
need to be in a hospital. In other words, doctors and hospitals
will be able to make up in volume what they might lose in lower
payments per patient.
2. While bundled payments for hospital care may constitute capitation lite, the Affordable Care Act also will test full capitation
payments. Under this demonstration project, Medicaid will select large safety net hospital systems or networks in five states
that will be reimbursed with global capitation fees.82 In other
words, the systems will receive a fixed annual fee per individual
to cover all of the individual’s health care needs during the year.
Given the ability of capitated compensation to reduce the incentive for doctors and hospitals to provide too much care, this
demonstration project could be very important.
3. Medicaid and Medicare will offer incentives for doctors, other
professionals and hospitals to form “accountable care organizations” that will become “accountable for the quality, cost and
overall care” of beneficiaries assigned to them. Accountable
care organizations will receive bonus payments if they meet
standards for quality while delivering care at a lower cost.83
81 PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2704, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a; § 3023, codified at
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc—4.
82 § 2705, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1315a.
83 § 2706, codified at 42 U.S.C. 1396a; § 3022, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj.
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Many health policy experts have promoted accountable care organizations for their ability to provide comprehensive, coordi84
nated and cost-effective care for patients. Because all of a patient’s caregivers are associated in a single organization, it becomes easier for the different caregivers to assume responsibility
for the patients’ overall care rather than for just their particular
part of the care. The Mayo Clinic is an important example of an
accountable care organization.
While accountable care organizations promise higher-quality,
lower-cost care, there are reasons to be concerned as well. Large
health care organizations can achieve a substantial level of market power and use that power to maintain high prices for their
services.85
If successful, the demonstration project reforms could have a major impact. However, because they are demonstration projects, they
would still have to be expanded to the entire Medicare and Medicaid
systems. Moreover, they also would have to be adopted by private
insurers to have a meaningful effect on overall health care costs.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act, with its individual mandate to purchase health care, looks very much like health care reform in Massa86
chusetts in its approach to increasing access to health care. The Act
also looks very much like health care reform in Massachusetts in its
failure to come to grips with the need for health care cost containment.
The Massachusetts legislature recognized the need to follow up
its expansion of coverage with measures to address costs, and the state
created a Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System in
2008.87 In 2009, the commission recommended the replacement of
fee-for-service reimbursement with capitation payments to physicians
and hospitals that have formed accountable care organizations.88 In
light of the similarities between the Massachusetts and federal laws,
84 Elliott Fisher et al., Fostering Accountable Health Care: Moving Forward in Medicare, 28
HEALTH AFF. w219, w220 (2009).
85 Robert Pear, Health Law Provision Raises Antitrust Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, February 9,
2011, at A19; Barak D. Richman & Kevin A. Schulman, A Cautious Path Forward on Accountable Care Organizations, 305 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 602, 602—03 (2011).
86 Jonathan Gruber, Massachusetts Points the Way to Successful Health Care Reform, 30(1)
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 184, 184-85 (2010).
87 Kaiser Family Foundation, Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Three Years Later
(Sept. 2009), www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7777-02.pdf.
88 Id.
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we can expect Congress to follow up in future years with more serious
efforts to contain health care costs, once the Affordable Care Act’s
provisions for expanding access to care have been implemented.
An important question is how future Congresses will respond to
the need for health care cost containment. If cost containment is done
properly, access to health care coverage can be maintained by making
care more cost-effective. However, when states have been faced with
cost pressures in the past, they often have responded by reducing
access rather than streamlining costs. Thus, for example, when the
Oregon Health Plan experienced serious cost problems several years
ago, it balanced its budget by raising eligibility thresholds and ended
up with levels of uninsured persons that were comparable to the levels
89
seen in Oregon before the Health Plan was implemented. Hence,
this article ends where it started — will Congress implement effective
cost controls, or will uncontrolled costs cause the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act to unravel?

89 Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health
Plan, 26 HEALTH AFF. w96, w99 (2007).

